The intentional view is plausible in that sexual desire can be quite complex and that its complexity is not captured well (or at all) by the pleasure view, given that human mentality infuses our most basic urges and appetites
Perhaps not. For example, if X wants to masturbate, X is not being led by blind instinct like a cat in heat; X can be thinking, “I look forward to enjoying the sensations of rubbing my clitoris with my favorite vibrator as I fantasize about having sex with my neighbor. ” In other words, “sexual desire can be focused or selective at the same time as being physical” (Goldman 1977: 279).
One problem is the difficulty of defining “sexual pleasure” (see below), which this view needs to do to be complete
But whether the intentional view is at odds with the pleasure view depends on our goals. If the latter is meant to capture the “essence” of the phenomenon, the two are compatible with each other; if our goal is a detailed description of the depth, complexity, and variety of the phenomenon, the pleasure view falls short. Given that definitions are not usually meant to convey the complexity of what they define, we should not expect a definition of sexual desire to be a full-blown theory sexual desire, while agreeing that it is a complex phenomenon.
This does not mean that the pleasure view of sexual desire https://www.besthookupwebsites.org/instanthookups-review/ is correct, only that its aim or strategy need not be misguided. Indeed, depending on how it is stated it might be wrong. For example, if the pleasure view conceptually ties sexual desire to sexual pleasure obtained through the touch of another person, it would be dualistic and might implausibly render many sexual desires as nonsexual, such as some masturbatory desires, voyeurism, and exhibitionism. Furthermore, the touch of another person’s body implies that zoophiliac desires are nonsexual. Continue reading “Is the pleasure view of sexual desire committed to understanding sexual desire as mere appetite?”